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Section 11 affords no defence to issuers for these statements and 
provides underwriters with established due diligence 
considerations.
Another negative aspect of the SEC's proposals is its approach 
to shelf offerings, which typically involve debt securities. By not 
allowing Form B to be used in shelf offerings, a significant 
portion of the securities market will be slowed considerably in 
its offering of such securities as compared with equity offerings 
using Form B. According to the SEC, approximately 30% of 
issuers currently eligible to use Form S 3 (and thus able to use 
a shelf registration) would not be able to use Form B (unless 
such offerings are made only to qualified institutional buyers, or 
'QIBs').
Much criticism has also been directed at the SEC's proposed 
elimination of Exxon Capital transactions. Exxon Capital is a line of 
SEC no-action letters that allows Rule 144A offerings to QIBs 
to be followed by a registered exchange offer of identical 
securities. Domestic issuers typically use Exxon Capital for high- 
yield debt securities. Foreign issuers use Exxon Capital in cases of 
an initial public offering made outside the US followed by a 
registered exchange offer to US QIBs. By eliminating Exxon 
Capital (and therefore free marketability), issuers would be 
forced to register the initial offering. This would incur a greater
cost for raising capital, especially for Form A issuers who must 
seek other forms of financing while waiting for SEC review of 
their filing.
The SEC requested that comments on its proposals be 
submitted by 5 April 1999. Interestingly, the SEC stated that its 
proposals were presented on a more tentative basis than in a 
typical release. Given that substantial public comment will be 
offered to the SEC in order to redress some of the problematic 
reforms mentioned above, it is likely that some of these 
proposals will be modified, perhaps dramatically. In any event, 
the proposals will not be implemented until after 31 March 
2000, in order to decrease the possibility of Year 2000 
problems. ©
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New protection and its limits under the Investor Compensation Act 1998
by Blanaid Clarke
A: result of the recent collapse of MMI, a Dublin 
LStockbroking firm with 
estimated debts of £ 14m, the issue 
of investor compensation has 
become a particularly pertinent 
one in Ireland. This is the first 
collapse of an authorised 
investment business firm in 
Ireland since the introduction of 
the Investor Compensation Act 1998i
last July. Clients owed money by
MMI can, at least, be reassured by the fact that they should not 
be affected by the provisional liquidation, once it is established 
that their funds are in order. Prior to the introduction of the 
Investor Compensation Act f 998, a number of financial scandals had 
occurred, culminating in the collapse of the Taylor Group of 
investment companies in August 1996, with losses of almost 
£2.5m to investors. These investors have little chance of 
recovering their losses. Whilst legislation had been introduced 
the previous year providing for the authorisation and supervision 
of investment firms, additional measures were clearly required.
The idea of an EU investor compensation scheme has its 
genesis in the Investment Services Directive 93/22/EEC ('the 
ISD') which provided for the mutual recognition of
authorisation and of prudential supervision systems, making 
possible the grant of a single authorisation valid throughout the 
EU and the application of the principle of home member state 
supervision. The ISD was implemented into Irish law in relation 
to stock exchange member firms by the Stock Exchange Act 1995 
and in relation to other investment business firms, by the 
Investment Intermediaries Act 1995 ('the 1995 Act'). With the 
advent of a harmonised financial market, it became increasingly 
important to ensure that each member state should provide an 
investor compensation scheme guaranteeing a harmonised 
minimum level to investor protection. The Investor 
Compensation Schemes Directive 97/9/EC ('the directive') was 
subsequently introduced requiring member states to ensure that 
schemes are in place to provide a minimum level of 
compensation to investors, in the event of the failure of an 
investment firm in circumstances where the firm proves unable 
to refund to investors the money or securities belonging to 
them.
The directive was implemented into Irish law by the Investor 
Compensation Act 1998 ('the Act') which provides for 
compensation for clients of investment and insurance 
intermediaries where the firms themselves are unable to return 
money or investment instruments belonging to clients. Although 
the directive merely requires schemes to be in place for firms 
authorised in accordance with the ISD or, alternatively, in
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accordance with the two banking directives (Directive 
77/780/EEC and Directive 89/646/EEC ), the scope of the Act 
is wider as it applies to 'investment firms'. An 'investment firm' 
for the purposes of the Act is defined as:
(a) an authorised investment business firm, as defined in the 
1995 Act;
(b) an authorised stock exchange member firm, as defined in 
the Stock Exchange Act 1995;
(c) a credit institution licensed in the state or a credit 
institution authorised under the banking directives to carry 
on investment services listed in the ISD; or
(d) an insurance intermediary.
Firms or persons who formerly fell into these categories until 
the revocation of their authorisation are also included.
One reason why the Act is more expansive than the directive 
is the inclusion of insurance intermediaries within its scope. 
These were included in the act because the government felt that 
it would be anomalous to introduce wide-ranging investor 
compensation arrangements which ignored the insurance sector, 
particularly when many intermediaries are involved in both 
insurance and non-insurance investment business. A second 
reason why the Act is more expansive than the directive is that 
the definition of an 'investment business firm' in the 1995 Act 
is broader than the definition in the ISD. The 1995 Act requires 
the authorisation of a wider group of firms than was strictly 
required by the ISD. The definition ol an 'investment business 
firm' in the 1995 Act refers to any person (other than a stock 
exchange member firm) who provides one or more investment 
business services or investment advice to third parties on a 
professional basis. The term 'investment business services' 
refers to a wide range of services specified in the 1995 Act, a 
range which far exceeds the equivalent term 'investment service' 
in the ISD. A number of categories of firm are, however.o ' '
excluded in the 1995 Act from the definition of an 'investment 
business firm'. For example, credit institutions which provide 
investment business services or investment advice \\ithout 
exceeding the terms of their authorisations under the two 
banking directives are excluded. Solicitors are also excluded in 
certain cases where they provide investment business services or 
investment advice in an incidental manner only and do not hold 
themselves out as being investment business firms.
A further category of firm expressly exempted from the 
requirements ol the Act is an authorised investment business 
firm which is not 'an investment firm' within the meaning of the 
directive, which has been certified by the Minister for Finance 
under s. 446(2) ot the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 and which 
does not provide investment services to domestic investors. 
Section 446(2) allows the minister to give a certificate certifying 
certain trading operations of a company as 'relevant trading 
operations' for the purposes of s. 446. To qualify as a relevant 
trading operation, the operation must be carried out in the 
Customs House docks area and must contribute to the 
development of the Irish Financial Services Centre. It must also 
be within one ol a number of specified classes ol trading 
operation which include: the provision of services in relation to 
foreign currency services to non-residents; the carrying on of 
certain other specified services (including global money 
management, insurance, fund management and certain dealing)
on behalf of non-residents; the provision of ancillary financial 
services for non-residents; dealings in commodity futures and 
options on behalf of non-residents and the development or 
supply of certain computer software.
The act appoints the Central Bank of Ireland ('the Bank') as 
the supervisory authority for investor compensation under the 
Act and the 'competent authority' in the state for the purposes 
of the directive. The Bank will be advised on compensation 
issues by the Investor Compensation Company Limited ('the 
Company') which is responsible for establishing and 
maintaining a compensation fund or funds to make payments to 
clients of investment firms. All investment firms, with the 
exception of certified persons who are entitled to participate in 
compensation schemes operated by approved professional 
bodies, must pay such contributions to the company as it 
specifies. In determining the contribution due from each of the 
firms, the company is required to ensure that it will be in a 
position to meet any reasonably foreseeable obligations under 
the Act and that the fund will have a sufficient balance to meet 
these obligations.
Where investment firms fail to comply with their obligations,
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the bank may give a written direction to the investment firm, its 
directors and managers requiring compliance or temporarily 
suspending the operation of all or some of its activities. An 
important effect of a direction is that while such a direction is in 
force, no vvinding-up proceedings may be taken and no receiver 
may be appointed or assets seized without the High Court's 
prior permission. Failure by an authorised investment business 
firm or a stock exchange member firm to comply with a 
direction, may lead to the bank applying to the High Court for 
an order confirming the direction or, more seriously, an order 
revoking the firm's authorisation. Where the investment firm iso
a credit institution, the bank will amend the firm's authorisation 
prohibiting it from providing the authorised investment 
services. Finally, where the investment firm is an insurance 
intermediary, the bank will inform the company and the firm 
itself of its non-compliance with its obligations under the Act.
A further method of ensuring the protection of investment 
clients is by imposing additional obligations on product 
producers. The 1995 Act requires the product producer to 
ensure that the intermediary to be appointed is a member of an 
approved representative body or a certified person or otherwise 
complies with that Act. A written appointment is a prerequisite 
to the acceptance of orders or the payment of commission. The 
Act now places an onus on the product producer, before making 
an appointment, to make reasonable inquires to ensure that any 
investment firm appointed has not had its authorisation revoked 
or has not been the subject of complaint to the company for 
failure to comply with its obligations under the Act. Where the 
bank has revoked the authorisation of an investment firm or 
informed the company that an insurance intermediary has failed 
to comply with its obligations under the Act, the Bank must also 
inform the relevant product producers from which the firm 
holds written appointments. The product producers must then 
cancel the written appointments of the investment firm and may 
not subsequently accept any orders transmitted by the firm or 
any moneys belonging to a client. Concerns were expressed that 
the public was not being adequately informed of the 
discontinuance of appointments and was continuing to trust its 
monev to firms which had been deemed unsuitable. The Act 31
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thus introduces a new provision requiring the intermediary to 
publish a 'notice of discontinuance' in at least one of the 
newspapers circulating in the state within 14 days from the time 
of notification of discontinuance. Where a notice is not 
published, the product producer itself must ensure publication. 
The duration of this period has been criticised as excessive, 
allowing a fraudulent intermediary too much time to defraud. 
The acceptance of publication as sufficient if the newspaper is 
'circulating in the state' has also been criticised. An 
intermediary could satisfy this requirement by publishing the 
notice in a provincial newspaper with a very local circulation 
figure. Yet, clearly, such an advertisement would not serve 
efficiently to inform all existing or potential investors.
The compensatable loss provided for by the Act is the lesser 
of 90% of the amount of an investor's net loss or 20,000 ECU, 
which is the minimum level set by the directive. The decision 
not to provide more than the minimum required has been the 
subject of much criticism. The government argued that it was 
necessary to strike a balance between 'the need to protect those 
investors who are least well placed to bear losses' on the one 
hand and, on the other, the principle of caveat emptor and the 
need to encourage investors to approach their investment 
decisions carefully. In addition, reliance was placed on the fact 
that experience in other countries demonstrates that 
approximately 80% of claims for compensation are for less than 
£20,000. The act also provides that certain losses will be 
irrecoverable. These include for example, moneys or investment 
instruments held by an investment firm of behalf of an excluded 
investor such as a professional client; moneys or investment 
instruments arising out of money laundering operations; or 
money or investment instruments entrusted to the firm at a 
time when the firm was not an authorised investment firm 
(unless the client was not aware and could not have been 
expected to be aware of this fact). In addition, the Act provides 
that where a claim is made in circumstances where a claim could 
also be made under the Deposit Guarantee Regulations, in 
respect of the same monies held by a credit institution, the bank 
will ensure that only one of the claims will be acceptable.
Investors are entitled to apply for compensation in two 
defined circumstances. The first is upon the determination of 
the bank that an investment firm is unable, due to its financial 
circumstances, to meet its debts and that there is no foreseeable 
opportunity of it being able to do so. The second is upon the 
making of ruling by the court which effectively prevent investors 
from recovering their funds from an intermediary for the time 
being. An example of such a ruling would be the appointment 
by the court of a liquidator to an investment firm. In these two 
circumstances, clients of the relevant investment firm must be 
notified and applications for payment invited within a specified 
time. Once notified by the administrator of the compensatable 
losses, the company or the approved scheme are obliged to 
make payments as soon as practicable and at least within three 
months. In exceptional circumstances, for example in the event 
of a major default, postponement of payment may be allowed.
The Act also provides for the subrogation of certain of the 
investors' rights. Where clients have been paid, the company or 
approved scheme will be subrogated to the rights of those clients 
in liquidation proceedings against the investment firm for the 
amount equal to their payments to the clients. The company or 
approved scheme will also be subrogated to the rights of those
investors in respect of payments made under a bond held by the 
firm and any payments made under a professional indemnity 
policy. This means that if any money remains in the investment 
firm after a client has been compensated, the client will not be 
entitled to any of that money until the company or approved 
scheme has recovered what it paid out in compensation. At this 
stage, the client will be entitled to claim the balance due.
In keeping with the directive, the Act anticipates both 'home 
country control' and supplemental cover. In order to avoid the 
level or scope of coverage provided becoming an instrument of 
competition, until 31 December 1999, where the 
compensatable loss arises from the provision of investment 
business services by an authorised investment business firm in 
another member state, the level of coverage provided will not 
exceed the maximum level or scope offered by the 
corresponding scheme in the host member state. The possibility 
also exists that the level or scope of coverage offered in the home 
member state may be lower than that offered in the host 
member state. As a result, branches may choose to join their 
host country's schemes in order to supplement their cover. 
Where an Irish investment firm has established a branch in 
another member state and has joined a compensation scheme 
within that country, but fails to comply with the obligations 
imposed on it as a result of its membership of the other member 
state's scheme, the Act requires that the bank be notified and 
take all appropriate measures to ensure compliance. Where 
investment firms authorised in other member states have 
branches in the state, the act provides that they may join Irish 
compensation schemes but that they must meet the relevant 
membership obligations, including the payment of all 
contributions and other charges.
CONCLUSION
It seems apparent that, despite the existence of legislation 
providing for the authorisation and supervision of investment 
firms, it is simply not possible to avoid the failure of investment 
firms and the ensuing loss to investors. Such failure may be 
attributable to a myriad of factors including, for example, 
defaulting creditors, poor investments, economic recession or 
fraud. In order to maintain confidence in the market, it is 
imperative that some form of investor compensation be 
provided and the Investor Compensation Act 1998 serves this 
function. It must be emphasised, however, that the Act will not 
compensate investors who make unwise investment choices. In 
this regard, investors must be prepared to accept responsibility 
for their own investment strategies. @
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